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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the development of the shadow banking sector in the US leading up to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Shadow banking, or nonbank financial intermediation, consists of credit intermediation that takes place outside of the traditional banking sector. This can include off-balance sheet operations at banks and finance holding companies as well as operations at other nonbank financial companies.
The paper reviews how shadow banking emerged as a result of regulatory arbitrage and the search for higher
returns before considering how it contributed to the buildup of systemic risk leading up to the crisis. It specifically inspects the role of money market funds (MMFs) in supporting shadow banking. Finally, it engages
with the reforms that emerged in the US in the wake of the crisis, concluding that more regulation is not necessarily the solution and advocating for a more holistic strategy geared towards oversight and supervision.

INTRODUCTION
The term “shadow banking” emerged in the financial vernacular
in the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis due to the role
nonbank financial institutions played in the credit boom leading up
to the crisis. Despite its nefarious name, shadow banking rather
benignly consists of forms of credit intermediation that take place
outside of the traditional banking sector. It can support economic activity by providing a valuable alternative source of credit for
many firms and households (Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
2012). By diversifying their clients’ financing options, shadow
banking activities facilitate competition between credit providers,
which can produce credit solutions better tailored to individual actors’ needs (Financial Stability Board, 2020). Like banks, shadow
bank entities perform services that include maturity, credit, and liquidity transformations; but unlike banks, they do not receive explicit or direct access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees—namely, traditional banks’ lender of last resort and
their access to deposit insurance (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, 2012).

but a smaller supply in bad times when people need it the most
(Financial Stability Board, 2017).
This paper will focus on the development of the shadow banking
activities in the US that contributed to buildup of systemic risk leading up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), specifically examining
the role of money market funds in supporting these operations. It
will mostly refer to the narrower definition of nonbank financial intermediation (which we will call “shadow banking activities”) that
emerged with the transformation of the US banking system from a
credit-risk intensive process to a market-risk intensive, wholesale
funded, and fee-based process (Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
2012). The change in the system gave rise to entities that benefited
from regulatory arbitrage to create new means of credit provisioning in and around the traditional banking system. After reviewing
the system that emerged in the runup to the crisis, the paper will
examine the particular role of money market mutual funds (MMFs)
in this system. Finally, it will engage with the US reforms that
emerged in the wake of the crisis before evaluating their efficacy
and identifying their drawbacks.

Such drawbacks, while excluding shadow banks from the stringent
capital and liquidity requirements traditional banks must meet— SHADOW BANKING: WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT A PROBthus creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage—create a large LEM?
potential for the shadow banking system to accumulate risk and
run into liquidity problems. Since shadow banking entities rely on The shadow banking system thrives off the extra returns offered by
short-term maturity transformation, as banks do, they can also ex- the lack of regulation in more opaque corners of the financial secperience “runs”, which are an inherent risk for any entity engaged tor. Shadow banking activities conducted by both entities close to
in liquidity and maturity transformation. However, not only do the banking system, like off-balance sheet operations at banks and
shadow banks lack the liquidity and credit guarantees that banks finance holding companies, and those further removed, like hedge
receive in order to mitigate the risk of runs, but they also do not funds and finance companies or insurance companies and pension
receive the same oversight and regulation that discourages banks funds, can generate risk that might spillover into the regular bankfrom engaging in risky activities in the first place. Also like the ing system (Financial Stability Board, 2017). As a result, a wide
banking system, a run can create contagion risk and support procy- variety of operations might qualify as shadow banking activities,
clicality in the system by providing plentiful credit in good times including asset-backed commercial paper channels, structured inPublished by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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vestment vehicles (SIVs), credit hedge funds, money market mu- such off-balance sheet liabilities did not factor into these banks’ caltual funds, securities lenders, limited-purpose finance companies culations of capital requirements or liquidity requirements, at least
(LPFCs) and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
not before the GFC. As a result, through off-balance sheet securitization and asset management techniques, FHC-affiliated banks
could lend with less capital than would have been required had they
kept the loans on their balance sheets, thus carving out a higher
RoE. More specifically, the bank subsidiary, underneath the FHC,
would originate the loan, warehouse and accumulate these off-balance sheet loans in a conduit managed by a broker-dealer subsidiary. These loans rely on wholesale funding markets like money
market funds (MMFs)—importantly, a less liquid form of funding
that is supposedly enhanced by the liquidity of the bank behind the
operation. The broker-dealer subsidiary then securitizes the loans
The New York Federal Reserve divides such operations into four cat- and transfers them into a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which is
egories, defining shadow banking as any form of credit intermedia- the off-balance structure of the loan. Finally, the safest tranches of
tion that is implicitly enhanced by official guarantees (debt issued or structured credit assets receive funding in another off-balance sheet
guaranteed by government-sponsored entities, reliant on the taxpay- asset-backed securities intermediary, such as a structured invester), indirectly enhanced by official guarantees (off-balance sheet ac- ment vehicle (SIV) (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012).
tivities of depository institutions like credit card loan commitments
and lines of credit to conduits), indirectly and implicitly enhanced Whereas a traditional bank originates, funds, and manages the risks
by official guarantees (bank-affiliated hedge funds, money market of its loans all on its own balance sheet, shadow banking activities
mutual funds, securities lending activities of custodian banks), or evidently involve increasingly complex credit intermediation chanunenhanced by official guarantees (securities lending activities of nels. In addition to the bank subsidiary, many loans and mortgages
insurance companies, pension funds and certain asset managers in the US would pass through a network of broker-dealers, asset
that don’t have access to official liquidity channels) (Federal Re- managers, and other vehicles, all under the FHC umbrella. And inserve Bank of New York, 2012). Looking at the system a different stead of receiving funding through deposits, they would rely on
way, we can also divide shadow banking activities between those other short-term funding options like MMFs and commercial paper
conducted by GSEs, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; “internal” (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012). Increasingly opaque
shadow banking operations that emerged among domestic US banks credit channels make it more difficult for liquidity to find its way
conducting off-balance sheet securitization and using asset-manage- through the system when it comes under stress. In other words, the
ment techniques that let financial holding company (FHC)-affiliated bank subsidiary is the only actor with access to deposit insurance
banks lend with less capital; “external” shadow banking operations and liquidity channels through the Federal Reserve discount winthat take advantage of funding and maturity transformation of struc- dow, but the other entities involved in the loan process take just as
tured credit assets from offshore financial centers and Europe, in large risks without as direct of a backstop, since they do not have
addition to the US; and the “parallel” banking system that includes easy access to these services. Plus, due to the interconnectedness of
nonbank finance companies and asset-backed securities intermedi- the system, the risk incurred by shadow banking activities in turn
aries driven by specialization and comparative advantage over regu- amplifies risk throughout the entire system and creates more opporlar banks. After the GFC, the majority of shadow banking activities tunities for contagion (Financial Stability Board, 2017).
outside those performed by GSEs exist in the parallel sub-system,
since many of the “internal” and “external” sub-systems relied on
pre-GFC economic and regulatory conditions (Federal Reserve A CLOSER LOOK AT MMFS
Bank of New York, 2012). This paper will focus on those internal
shadow banking activities that amplified the crisis in the US, as well Short-term funding, namely that offered by MMFs, played a large
as the means of facilitating shadow banking across all four types, role in building up off-balance sheet risk and accelerating the fiand the reforms enacted in the wake of the GFC to mitigate the ac- nancial crisis in September of 2008. Generally considered of high
cumulation of risk in such activities.
credit quality, MMFs invest in instruments like commercial paper, repurchase agreements, and US Treasuries (Gelzinis, 2019).
However, even though MMFs invest in these short-term debt inTHE BUILDUP OF RISK
struments (making them more susceptible to roll-over risk) MMF
shares are redeemable on demand. Since they intend to maintain a
The internal shadow banking system emerged as a result of reg- stable net asset value (NAV), MMFs can give investors the impresulatory arbitrage in the 30 years preceding the GFC. Before this sion of the same safety as holding demand deposits—but the fedshift, banks operated as low return-on-equity (RoE) entities that eral government does not guarantee MMFs with deposit insurance
originated, held, and funded loans through the use of deposits until (Financial Stability Board, 2017). In other words, MMF investors
they reached maturity. With the transformation, the FHC-affiliated can redeem their shares on demand by selling them back to the
banks could become high RoE entities by originating, warehous- fund, but without a government guarantee behind their “deposit”.
ing, and securitizing loans that they then distributed to other en- By calling their shares, investors redeem at per share NAV, which
tities or retained in their own off-balance sheet asset management reflects the value of the fund’s assets minus its liabilities. Because
vehicles (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2012). Of course, MMFs usually managed to maintain a stable NAV of $1 per share
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/26
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before the GFC, investors felt they could treat MMFs as a safe alternative to bank deposits. MMFs let them diversify their holdings.
If the NAV falls below $1, the MMF is said to “break the buck,”
which can cause panic among investors. They worry the fund could
suffer further losses, so a run-like scenario ensues where investors
hurry to withdraw their shares, only increasing the likelihood the
fund suffers further losses (Congressional Research Service, 2020).
Given the instrumental role MMFs played in funding the interconnected shadow banking activities examined above, the Lehman
Brothers Holding Inc.’s filing for bankruptcy on September 15,
2008 caused major problems for the MMF that held Lehman-issued
debt. The next day, the prominent Reserve Primary Fund had no
choice but to write off its Lehman debt, causing its per share NAV
to drop from $1 to $0.97. In other words, the fund broke the buck,
triggering a run in money markets as investors worried that other MMFs would break the buck as well (Congressional Research
Service, 2020). Note that the run is what deposit insurance in the
normal banking system should prevent from occurring by dissuading depositors of the need to withdraw all of their money for fear
the bank would become insolvent, when it is really just illiquid.
Traditional banks’ capital and liquidity buffers also guard against
this. Since preventing the run greatly lowers the probability that the
bank becomes insolvent in the first place, such preventative measures are top priority for bank regulators—but the MMFs aren’t
regulated like banks. Within a week of the Lehman bankruptcy, investors redeemed about $300 billion from various MMFs—taking
14% out of the industry. At the Reserve Primary Fund alone, a $62
billion money market fund, investors called about $40 billion in
just two days. Holding about 40% of outstanding commercial paper
in 2008, the MMF retreat caused companies that issued short-term
debt to be shut out of credit markets. MMFs’ role in city and municipal short-term debt markets caused a similar problem as these
entities also had to find other sources of short-term funding (Perspectives on Money, 2012). Finally, the money market run put pressure on broker-dealers, who were conducting highly interconnected credit intermediation between many market participants, since
they relied on short-term funding solutions like MMFs (Financial
Stability Board, 2017). In this way, the run in money markets amplified the credit crunch occurring throughout the financial system
at the beginning of the crisis, reflecting the pitfalls of MMFs’ lack
of government backstops that might have discouraged a run in the
first place.

to SEC chairman Mary L. Schapiro’s 2012 testimony before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
reforms supposedly helped the MMFs handle a three week period
in June 2011 in which investors called in about $100 billion worth
of shares; nevertheless, she points out that these redemptions occurred over a longer period, were of a smaller magnitude, and did
not occur in tandem with losses in fund portfolios (Perspectives on
Money, 2012). In other words, the 2011 episode did not prove the
efficacy of the initial reforms. It is also worth noting that the reform
did not require funds to comply with the new expectation to be able
to process transactions at prices other than the stable NAV until
October 31, 2011 (Money Market Fund Reform). We might see this
rule change reflected in Figure 1, which shows a large drop in the
total value of US MMFs once they began conducting transactions
below the stable NAV shortly before 2012. This might be the result
of lower NAVs or less MMF activity overall.

Figure 1. Total Absolute Market Value of All Holdings of US Money Market Funds (2011-2021). Note. Original figure; data compiled in the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve’s historical data on Money Market
Funds: Investment Holdings Detail

In 2014, additional reforms to NAV pricing helped to address some
remaining weaknesses. This generation of regulation relies on the
division of MMFs into three categories: municipal, which are tax-exempt and invest in national or state municipal securities; government,
which are the most creditworthy and invest in securities backed by
the US government; and prime, which are investments into corporate debt, certificates of deposits, repurchase agreements, and other
corporate instruments. MMFs can also be divided between retail,
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AND SUBSEQUENT REFORMS which means they are held by individual investors, and institutional, which means they are held by organizations. After further review
In an attempt to slow down the redemptions and ease short-term in July 2014, the SEC required all institutional prime and institufunding markets, in September 2008 the Treasury Department ex- tional municipal MMFs to float their NAV, as opposed to keeping a
plicitly guaranteed the $1.00 share price for more than $3 trillion stable value, in order to more accurately reflect the market value of
worth of MMF shares (Perspectives on Money, 2012). However, the fund (Congressional Research Service, 2020). In other words,
the crisis made it clear that the MMF industry needed reform to MMFs began to buy and sell their shares using the market value of
discourage such large redemptions from occurring in the future. the fund’s assets, theoretically making investors more accustomed
In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopt- to changes in share prices and less likely to call in their shares all at
ed initial measures meant to reduce the risks of MMF portfolios. once (Perspectives on Money, 2012). Government and retail MMFs
The Commission reduced maturity periods, raised credit stan- could still use a stable NAV (Congressional Research Service, 2020),
dards, and put liquidity requirements in place to fortify MMFs’ and the SEC saved the final compliance date for funds to reclassify
abilities to meet redemptions. It also mandated the MMFs report as prime or government and for prime funds to float their NAVs unmore information about their portfolio to the public. According til October 14, 2016 (2014 Money Market Fund Reform Frequently
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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Asked Questions). Likely as a result, in the period between passing
the regulation in 2014 and the new distinctions between government
and prime coming into effect in 2016, we see a shift in the share that
government vs prime funds make up in the market. The greater share
of prime funds suggests a greater share of MMFs investing in riskier
securities like corporate debt rather than “safer” government securities. However, the addition of prime funds’ floating NAV might also
have caused a distortion in the value of prime vs government funds.
Finally, some of the shift from government to prime might also be
the result of some MMFs reclassifying from government to prime.

which go beyond the scope of this MMF-focused paper, include the
establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, specifically tasked to identify and address financial stability threats, in part
through its authority to designate a nonbank financial firm as a systemically important financial institution (SIFI) subject to enhanced
supervisory and regulatory standards (Gelzinis, 2019). Nevertheless,
after an initial drop in the wake of the GFC, MMFs across what the
FSB terms the 21+ Euro area Group have grown even larger than
their peak in the runup to the crisis (see Figure 4). In fact, collective
investment vehicles subject to runs, including credit hedge funds,
real estate funds, as well as MMFs, have also grown since the GFC.
Finance companies and broker-dealers, who make use of short-term
debt instruments like MMFs, have also maintained their high leverage, continued to engage in some maturity transformations, and
grown in terms of market size (see Figures 5 and 6) (Financial Stability Board, 2017). On one hand, these trends suggest that the types of
shadow banking activities that contributed to the GFC are still major
players in today’s financial system, potentially paving the way for future liquidity crunches. On the other hand, the financial system might
prefer that shadow banking activity remain in these “known” and
now lightly regulated entities, rather than finding new, “unknown”
credit intermediaries that regulators do not know to watch for.

Figure 2. Total Absolute Market Value of All Holdings of US Money Market Funds (Prime, Municipal, and Government, 2011-2021). Note. Original
figure; data compiled in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve’s
historical data on Money Market Funds: Investment Holdings Detail

The SEC also allowed MMF boards to impose redemption fees
up to 2% and redemption gates up to ten days for all non-government MMFs in order to discourage the magnitude and frequency
of redemptions, which should help guard against a run. Finally, the
SEC reform created macroprudential stress testing requirements for
MMFs. These require the funds stress test their ability to maintain
10% weekly liquid assets and minimize the volatility of their principal in the face of hypothetical stress scenarios presented by the
SEC. MMFs must demonstrate they can withstand challenges like Figure 3. Days until Maturity, US Money Market Funds (2011-2021). Note.
short-term interest rates rising, certain portfolio security positions Original figure; data compiled in the Board of Governors of the Federal Redowngrading or going into default, and widening spreads in a num- serve’s historical data on Money Market Funds: Investment Holdings Detail
ber of different sectors (Congressional Research Service, 2020).
When it comes to evaluating the new regulation, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) asserts in its 2017 shadow banking assessment
that these reforms have helped to lower the vulnerabilities of MMFs
and repurchase agreements (Financial Stability Board, 2017). For
instance, Figure 3 shows a decrease in the maturity of US MMFs
since the early 2010s. This would increase their resilience to liquidity risks since a shorter maturity makes these short-term instruments easier to call in. We see a runup in days until maturity before
the 2016 compliance deadline, but otherwise maturity length shows
a downward trend with cyclicality we might attribute to the business cycle. This decline has helped contribute to the overall decline
in shadow banking activities that contributed to the GFC (Financial
Figure 4. Money Market Funds in the 21+ Euro Group (2002-2018). Note.
Stability Board, 2017).
Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB Global Monitoring Report on
Additional measures to address the shadow banking sector in the US, Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
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are attracting more capital if they are able to deliver higher yields
(at least in good times). The same logic explains how the shifting
of loans to off-balance sheet asset management vehicles, which in
part relied on short-term funding provided by MMFs, helped turn
FHCs into high RoE entities by allowing them to avoid such regulatory requirements. However, in addition to the obvious proposition
that more regulation drives activity (particular innovation like that
likely captured by Figure 7) to less-regulated areas of the banking
sector, regulation also drives activity into less supervised areas of
the banking sector. In other words, in spite of the continued growth
of shadow banking activities, more regulation is not necessarily the
answer, especially if it drives activity from “known” entities—like
FHCs’ off-balance sheet activities that supervisors know to keep an
eye on—to “unknown” entities like those in Figure 7 that are harder
for supervisors to observe.
Figure 5. Finance Companies in the 21+ Euro Group (2002-2018). Note.
Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB Global Monitoring Report on
Non-Bank Financial Intermediation

Figure 7. Other (Unidentified) Shadow Banking Activities in the 21+ Euro
Group (2002-2018). Note. Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB
Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation
Figure 6. Broker-Dealers in the 21+ Euro Group (2002-2018). Note.
Original figure; data compiled in 2019 FSB Global Monitoring Report on
Non-Bank Financial Intermediation

CONCLUSION: UNFINISHED BUSINESS?

Regarding the specific case of MMFs, regulatory authorities
might still consider additional measures. While the FSOC designation authority should enhance regulatory standards imposed
on the largest and most systemically important shadow banks that
might rely on money markets, their weakened authority under the
Trump administration casts doubts on their ability to effectively
designate and supervise these interconnected entities. Additional regulatory options include subjecting prime MMFs to capital
buffer requirements that would theoretically guard against largescale defaults. However, an ability to absorb large defaults would
require such a large and costly buffer that returns on MMFs would
become comparable to default free securities (Lewis, 2015). Not
only would such regulation defeat the whole reason behind holding MMFs, but it would also likely shift investors to other, unregulated types of credit intermediaries.

By definition, shadow banking activities emerge in those portions
of the financial sector that can escape direct supervision and prudential standards put in place by regulatory authorities. As a result,
bank-like capital and liquidity requirements imposed on one type
of credit intermediary should, by the logic of arbitrage, shift market
activity to parts of the financial sector are not required to bear as
high costs in order to hold reserves. The large size of “other” shadow banking activities that the FSB has not identified hints at the
potential for market activity to shift to such unknown entities if the
known entities come under tighter regulation (see Figure 7). Com- Given the large size of shadow banking activities that already fall
pared to the total assets of all commercial banks in the US, which into the “other” category, a more holistic strategy geared towards
follows a steadier growth pattern over the last 20 years (see Figure oversight and supervision, rather than merely regulation, might be
8), the dramatic increase in the size of the shadow banking sector more suited to shadow banking. This would involve supervisors
of the 21+ Euro Group suggests that traditional understandings of regularly assessing a variety of metrics, including the maturity of
nonbank financial services are failing to capture innovation in the these various instruments, which gives information about liquidshadow banking sector. In other words, it is not a coincidence that ity risks, and, in the context of MMFs, the relative sizes of prime
innovations are occurring on the frontiers of regulatory reach and (which are riskier) vs government (safer) MMF markets. Since
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2021
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Figure 1. Total Assets, All US Commercial Banks (2000-2020). Note: Figure obtained from FRED Economic Data, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis

gauging risk in a market is so difficult, it is better that supervisors
have the data to assess known entities rather than push innovating
entities out of their vision with too much regulation. Less regulation would not push these innovators out, and rather leave them in
plain sight of the supervisor. A process of monitoring and subsequently regulating only the largest and most systemically important entities theoretically guards against the dangers of contagion
spreading to unprepared, highly interconnected actors. Restraint
towards smaller shadow banking activities still preserves the
higher returns that keeps them in the shadows, without running
as great a risk of pushing activity into unknown territory—it is a
matter of choosing the known shadows over the unknown shadows, so long as the known shadows are easier to monitor.

Financial Stability Board. (2020, January 19). Global monitoring
report on non-bank financial intermediation 2019.

REFERENCES

Lewis, C. M. (2015). Money market fund capital buffers. SSRN
Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2687687

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Total Assets, All Commercial Banks [TLAACBW027SBOG], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TLAACBW027SBOG, March 29,
2021.
Gelzinis, G. (2019, July). Strengthening the regulation
and oversight of shadow banks. Center for American Progress.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/
reports/2019/07/18/471564/strengthening-regulation-oversight-shadow-banks/

Board of Governors of the Federal Research System. (March
19, 2021). Money Market Funds: Investment Holdings Detail. Money Market Fund Reform, C.F.R. (2010). https://www.sec.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/efa/efa-project-mon- gov/rules/final/2010/ic-29132.pdf
ey-market-funds-investment-holdings-detail.htm
Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reforms: Hearings
Congressional Research Service. (2020, March 24). Money mar- before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
ket mutual funds: A financial stability case study.
(2012) (testimony of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Mary L. Schapiro). https://www.sec.gov/news/testiFederal Reserve Bank of New York. (2012, February). Shadow mony/2012-ts062112mlshtm
banking.
2014 money market fund reform frequently asked questions.
Financial Stability Board. (2017, July 3). Assessment of shadow (2021, February 17). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commisbanking activities, risks and the adequacy of post-crisis policy sion. Retrieved April 5, 2021, from https://www.sec.gov/investment/2014-money-market-fund-reform-faq
tools to address financial stability concerns.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yurj/vol2/iss1/26

6

YURJ | Vol 2.1

Spring 2021

6

